Federal Judge Wrote That Osteen Lied; Fourth Amendment Claim Still Dismissed Under Qualified Immunity
Magistrate Judge Andrew M. Edison wrote that “the record shows that Osteen lied to Judge Tollison” and concluded the complaint stated an unreasonable-seizure claim before recommending qualified immunity. Judge Jeffrey V. Brown later adopted the recommendation and entered judgment against Reardon.
Originally published by Don Matthews on We The People News on August 12, 2026.
Chief Justice John Marshall wrote in Marbury v. Madison that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is.” This story has two federal judges in it, and only one of them actually did that work in detail.
Magistrate Judge Andrew M. Edison, reviewing the civil-rights case against Galveston police officer William Osteen, wrote: “I take no pleasure in this result. The record shows that Osteen lied to Judge Tollison. That is disturbing.” He also concluded that the complaint stated an unreasonable-seizure claim over the vehicle impoundment before recommending qualified immunity.
The complaint stated a Fourth Amendment claim. Qualified immunity still ended it.
On the seizure of my vehicle after my August 2023 arrest — towed and later auctioned off while friends stood at the scene ready to take custody of it themselves — Edison wrote: “Because it was unreasonable to impound Reardon’s vehicle, Reardon has stated a constitutional claim for unreasonable seizure.” That was a pleading-stage conclusion that the complaint stated a claim, not a final merits judgment that a constitutional violation had been proven.
Officer Osteen and Sergeant Doraty nevertheless received qualified immunity. Edison’s analysis was that, although the complaint stated an unreasonable-seizure claim, I had not identified sufficiently specific clearly established precedent to defeat that defense.
That sequence matters: a court can hold at the pleading stage that a complaint states a constitutional claim and still dismiss it because existing precedent is not sufficiently specific to overcome qualified immunity. That is why the doctrine remains heavily debated.
Why the lie didn’t change the probable-cause result
Edison concluded that, even without Osteen’s inconsistent statements about the odor of alcohol and my pupils, other circumstances supplied independently sufficient probable cause for the DWI arrest.
So Edison’s statement that “the record shows that Osteen lied to Judge Tollison,” however disturbing, did not change his probable-cause analysis. The court treated the remaining circumstances as independently sufficient.
Then the district judge adopted the recommendation
Edison wrote thirty-three pages addressing the record and the law. On July 28, 2026, I filed nine written objections under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Only one asked the district court to reconsider a substantive legal conclusion on qualified immunity. Several sought dismissal without prejudice and leave to amend. Another asked the court to preserve Edison’s finding about Osteen’s testimony and hold a narrow hearing. Others were reservations or express non-objections.
On August 10, 2026, U.S. District Judge Jeffrey Vincent Brown stated that the court had carefully considered the objections and adopted the recommendation as the opinion of the court. The order did not separately explain how the different objections were resolved, apart from addressing my request to amend again.
My argument about probable cause
The warrant affidavit said Officer Osteen smelled a “moderate odor of alcohol.” The blood test later showed no alcohol, and Osteen later testified that he could not smell alcohol on my breath. I continue to argue that probable cause should be judged on the facts sworn to at the time, not reconstructed after the original narrative breaks down.
Edison’s recommendation also noted a separate timeline problem in my Mississippi history: taking my allegations as true, he wrote that it was unclear how a sentence could have been revoked for violating a banishment condition before that condition took effect.
What happens now
The final judgment started the appellate clock. I intend to take the qualified-immunity and review issues to the Fifth Circuit.